Abstract. We analyze an N + 1-player game and the corresponding mean field game with state space {0, 1}. The transition rate of j-th player is the sum of his control α j plus a minimum jumping rate η. Instead of working under monotonicity conditions, here we consider an anti-monotone running cost. We show that the mean field game equation may have multiple solutions if η < 1 2 . We also prove that that although multiple solutions exist, only the one coming from the entropy solution is charged (when η = 0), and therefore resolve a conjecture of [9] .
Introduction
The theory of mean field games (MFGs) was introduced recently (2006) (2007) independently by Lasry, Lions (see [12] , [13] , [14] ) and Caines, Huang, Malhamé (see [10] , [11] ). It is an analysis of limit models for symmetric weakly interacting N + 1-player differential games; see e.g. [3] , [4] . The solution of MFGs provides an approximated Nash Equilibrium. It also under some conditions follows that MFGs are limit points of N + 1-player Nash equilibria.
The influential work [2] by Cardaliaguet, Delarue, Lasry, and Lions established the convergence of closed loop equilibria using the the so-called master equation, which is a partial differential equation with terminal conditions whose variable are time, state and measure. It is known that under the monotonicity condition, the master equation possess a unique solution, which is used to show the above convergence. A similar analysis was carried in finite state mean field games by Bayraktar and Cohen [1] and Cecchin and Pelino [5] independently obtain the above convergence result (as well as the the analysis of its fluctuations).
In this paper, we consider a case when the monotonicity assumption is not satisfied and resolve a conjecture of [9] , in which a two-state mean field game with Markov feedback strategies is analyzed. In this game the transition rate of each player is the sum of his control and a background jump rate η ≥ 0. Supposing an anti-monotone running cost (follow the crowd game), [9] poses a conjecture on the nature of the limits of N + 1-player Nash equilibrium. We proceed by using similar techniques to [6] , which considers an anti-monotone terminal condition. In particular, we again rely on the entropy solution of the master equation to prove the convergence and show that the limit of N + 1-player Nash equilibrium selects the unique mean field equilibrium induced by this entropy solution. In [6] , they showed that the mean field game equation has at most three equations, while in our model if η < 1 2 , the number of solutions is increasing with time horizon and can be arbitrarily large. Also, the entropy solution in our case cannot be written down explicitly, and so we need to construct using the characteristics and check that it is entropic. Let us also mention the recent work by [7] , where they study linear-quadratic mean field games in the diffusion setting. To re-establish the uniqueness of MFG solutions, they add a common noise and prove that the limit of MFG solutions as noise tends to zero is just the solution induced by the entropy solution of the master equation without common noise.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the N + 1-player game we are considering, and introduce the equations characterizing the mean field equilibria. In Section 3, we show that the forward backward equation characterizing the mean field game possesses a unique solution if η ≥ 1 2 , may have multiple solutions if η < 1 2 . Furthermore, we also determine the number of solutions. In Section 4, we explicitly find the entropy solution of the master equation. In Section 5, we show that if η = 0 each player in the N + 1-player game will follow the majority and briefly present that the optimal trajectories of N + 1-player game converges to the optimal trajectory induced by the entropy solution of the master equation.
Two states mean field games
We consider the N + 1-players game with state space Σ = {0, 1}, and denote the state of players by Z(t) := (Z j (t)) N +1 j=1 , which evolves as controlled Markov processes. The jump rate of Z j (t) is given by α j (t, Z(t)) + η, where α j : [0, T ] × Σ N +1 → [0, +∞) is the control of player j and η ≥ 0 is the minimum jump rate, i.e.,
Denote by A the collection of all the measurable and locally integrable functions [0, T ] × Σ N +1 → [0, +∞), and by α N +1 = (α 1 , . . . , α N +1 ) ∈ A N +1 the control of all players. It is can be easily seen that the law of Markov process is determined by the control vector α N +1 . Let the empirical measure of player j at time t to be
Then given the running cost function
the control vector α N +1 ∈ A N +1 and it is associated Markov process (Z(t)) 0≤t≤T , the objective function of the k-th player is defined by
For a control vector α N +1 ∈ A N +1 and β ∈ A, define the perturbed control vector by
To find the Nash equilibrium, it is standard to solve its corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi equations for value functions V N +1 (t, i, θ), i = 0, 1 (see e.g. [8] ).
(HJB)
where the optimal control is given by
It is also easy to write down the corresponding mean field game equation,
and see e.g. [8] and the corresponding master equation, the corresponding master equation, (ME)
see Bayraktar, Cohen [1] and Cecchin, Pelino [5] . Recall from the latter two references that the uniqueness of (MFG) and (ME) is guaranteed by the so-called monotonicity condition, i.e., for every θ, θ
which does not hold true with our choice of running cost.
non-uniqueness
We show that the mean field equations (MFG) may have multiple solutions. Taking
The second one of (3.1) is equivalent to
Taking derivative with respect to t in (3.2) and in conjunction with (3.1), we obtain
For simplicity, we time reverse the system and try to solve
Since (3.4) contains only the y variable, it can be uniquely solved if imposing the initial conditions y(0) = 0, d dt y(0) = v, and we denote its C 1 solution as y v (.). Therefore the number of solutions to (3.4) is just the number of initial velocity v such that 2θ − 1 = x v (T ), where for any t ≥ 0
We rewrite the differential equation as a derivative with respect to y instead of t, i.e.,
We can therefore get an implicit solution
where G(y) = 1 4 y 4 + 2η|y| 3 + 4η 2 y 2 − y 2 . When y ≥ 0, the first order derivative of G is
It is then easy to conclude the following results
, the function G(y) is strictly increasing for y ≥ 0; , and then increasing to +∞ over the interval [ η 2 + 2 − 3η, +∞), we know that the function y → G(y) + v 2 decreases over [0, y(v)) and crosses 0 at y(v), which implies that y(v) is a simple root.
whose role will be clear in the next result.
Lemma 3.1. The following properties hold for solutions y v (.),
Proof. The first statement is clear. We prove the rest by writing down the unique C 1 solution explicitly.
If
for any z ∈ R and thus we obtain from (3.6) that
Since the function y →
is strictly increasing, for any t <
, we can find a unique y v (t) such that
It can be seen that the function t → y v (t) is C 1 , and therefore is the unique solution to (3.4). Since G(y v (t)) + v 2 is always nonnegative, the solution y v (t) must oscillate between [−y(v), y(v)]. For any 0 ≤ t ≤ T (v), there exists a unique y v (t) such that
Define a periodic function, still denoted by y v (.),
It can be easily seen that y v (t) is the unique C 1 solution to (3.4). 
As a result of Lemma 3.1, the solution y v (.) is finite at T if and only if v < u, and there exists a unique y v (T ) > 0 such that
and also
, ∀z ∈ R, we obtain
from which we can conclude x v 1 (T ) < x v 2 (T ). As a result of lim v→u y v (T ) = +∞, we obtain lim v→u x v (T ) = +∞, and thus there exists a unique solution to (3.4) for any 2θ − 1 ∈ R.
As a result of the above proposition, the mean field equation (3.1) may have multiple solutions only if η < 1 2 . To find the number of solutions, we study the period of y v (.) in the following lemma. Note that since y −v (t) = −y v (t) and y 0 (t) = 0, it suffices for us to consider the period of y v (.) for v ∈ (0, v 0 ).
, and y(v) is the smallest postive root of z → G(z)+v 2 . Recall (3.7) and define
. Then both T (.) and H(.) are increasing with respect to v over the interval (0, v 0 ), and lim
Proof. By the definition, we have G(y) + v 2 = (
, from which we can conclude that y(v) ≥ v, and therefore H(v) is positive.
By change of variable p = z y(v) , we obtain
Denote the square of the bottom of the integrand by P (v, p), i.e.,
To prove T (v) is increasing, it suffices to show that P (v, p) is decreasing with respect to v for any fixed p ∈ [0, 1].
Since y(v) is an increasing function of v, the derivative dP dv (v, p) is no larger than dP dv (v, 1), which is equal to 0 according to the definition of y(v),
We can also rewrite H(v) as
and it is enough to show that v → v y(v) is decreasing. Taking derivative of the following equation
, and thus
As a result of
We conclude our claim by the following computation,
In the end, it can be seen that the function z → G(z) + v 2 0 is always positive over the interval [0, +∞) and only attains 0 at z = η 2 + 2 − 3η. Since G(z) + v 2 0 is a polynomial, we obtain that y(v 0 ) = η 2 + 2 − 3η, (z − η 2 + 2 + 3η) 2 is a factor of G(z) + v 2 0 , and hence 
Moving the last term to the left, taking square of both sides and plugging in the formula of G(y), it becomes
which is equivalent to v 2 − (y v (T )) 2 = 0. Therefore we obtain that |y
, from which we conclude that x v (T ) = 0 if and
, it can be seen that for t ≤ T 1 (0+), v = 0, we have x v (t) = 0. Before computing the number of solutions, we still need one more result, which is also important for us to construct the entropy solution of the master equation in the next section.
, as in the proof of Lemma 3.1 we have
which contradicts to Lemma 3.2.
Step 2. For any
, we have y v 1 (t) < y v 2 (t), which can be proved as in Step 1.
Step 3. For any 0 < v 1 < v 2 ≤ v 0 , we prove that
}, where supreme is attained by the continuity of x v 1 (.) and x v 2 (.). To show the contradiction, we prove that d dt (x v 2 (t) − x v 1 (t)) < 0, in which case these two curves have to intersect after time t since x v 2 decreases to 0 at time
If t ≥ T (v 1 ), we have
Since we proved y v 1 (t) < y v 2 (t), the derivative d dt y v 2 (t) must be negative, and hence
Combining (3.9) and
Because of (3.9) and the fact that y v 2 (t) > y v 1 (t), we deduce that
If t < T (v 1 ), by the same reasoning we have
Accordingly, it suffices to show that
Taking square of (3.10) , we obtain the equivalent inequality v 2 2 + 4ηy v 2 (t) − 1 < 0. Since y v 2 (t) ≤ y(v 2 ), we conclude our claim by the following computation
Step 4. For any
, which can be proved as in Step 3.
Step 5. Until now we have shown that the stopped curves {x v (t) : 0 ≤ t < T 1 (v)} do not intersect, and it remains to prove that for any (x, t) ∈ R + × R + , there exists a v(x, t) ∈ R + such that x v (t) = x, t < T 1 (v). Note that according to (3.4), for any fixed t, the couple (y v (t), x v (t) = x v 0 (t) and the continuity of v → x v (t), we know that there must exist some v ∈ (0, v 0 ) such that x v (t) = x. The equality t < T 1 (v) simply follows from the inequality t ≤ T 1 (0+) < T 1 (v). Suppose x < x v 0 (t) and t > T 1 (0+). Since T 1 (v) increases to +∞ as v increases to v 0 , we know that there exists a unique v ′ ∈ (0, v 0 ) such that t = T 1 (v ′ ), which also implies x v ′ (t) = 0. According to the continuity of v ′ → x v ′ (t), and the fact that lim . Then there exists a unique solution to (3.4) for any T > 0 if |2θ − 1| ≥ 1 − η 2 − η η 2 + 2, and the number of solutions to (3.4) can be arbitrarily large if |2θ − 1| < 1 − η 2 − η η 2 + 2 and T is large enough. In particular, the number of solutions with boundary condition 2θ − 1 = 0 is given by
Proof. Recalling v 0 = −G( η 2 + 2 − 3η), we first prove that x v 0 (t) is increasing with respect to t and lim
Taking derivative of the following equation,
we get
Since both sides of (3.11) are positive, it is enough to show that
Plugging in the equality d dt y v 0 (t) = G(y v 0 (t)) + v 2 0 and the formula of G, the inequality becomes 2η(y v 0 (t)) 3 + (4η
0 ≥ 0. Now we finish proving x v 0 (t) is increasing by the following equality,
Recall Lemma 3.1, y v 0 (t) is given by the equation
Combining the equality proved in Lemma 3.2 that √
= +∞, we conclude that lim t→+∞ y v 0 (t) = η 2 + 2 − 3η. Also, according to (3.6), we get that
Therefore by (3.5), we conclude the second claim
It can be seen that the curves {x v (t) : t ≥ 0, v ≥ v 0 } never cross each other, and that x v (t) < 1 − η 2 − η η 2 + 2 for any t > 0 if v < v 0 . Therefore according to Lemma 3.3 
As a result of Lemma 3.3, M (v) is actually an increasing function, and there exists a uniquē v ∈ (0, v 0 ) such that M (v) = 2θ − 1. Also for any v ∈ [v, v 0 ), we can define t(v) as the unique t satisfying x v (t) = 2θ − 1, t < T 1 (v), which is also an increasing function of v. Then (x v (.), y v (.)) is a solution of (3.3) with time horizon T = t(v). Since the period of x v (.) is 4T (v), and lim
. Therefore we conclude that the number of solutions to (3.3) with time horizon T is greater than sup
which can be arbitrarily large if T is large enough.
In the end, we consider the number of solutions for the terminal condition 2θ − 1 = 0. We have already shown that T k (v) is the time when x v (t) attains zero. According to Lemma 3.2, the functions T k (v) are increasing with respect to v for each k ∈ N and lim
, and v = 0 is always a solution, the number of solutions is just
The Master Equation
Letting Y (t, θ) = U (t, 1, θ) − U (t, 0, θ), x = 2θ − 1, and time reverse the master equation (ME), we obtain the closed equation
with the boundary condition
Since the equation has the form of a scalar conservation law, there exists a unique entropy solution. By the method of characteristics, we directly construct a piecewise C 1 solution to (4.1) and then check it is entropic.
Rewriting (4.1) as
and letting y(t) = Y (t, x(t)), d dt x = 2ηx − y + x|y|, we obtain the characteristic curve of (4.1)
whose solution is given explicitly in Lemma 3.1. If η ≥ 1 2 , the solution given by characteristic curves is smooth everywhere. If η < 1 2 , the shock curve is taken to be γ(t) = 0, t ∈ R + . See our illustration in Figure 1 .
Proposition 4.1. The function Y (x, t) := y v(x,t) (t) is the entropy solution of (4.1) with shock curve γ(t) = 0, t > T 1 (0+), where v(x, t) ∈ R is defined in Lemma 3.3. Proof. It is clear that the function Y (x, t) is C 1 outside the shock curve, and we only need to check the Rankine-Hugoniot condition and the Lax condition (see [6, Proposition 3] ). Define
If t > T 1 (0+), there exists a v > 0 such that t = T 1 (v) since v → T 1 (v) is increasing to +∞ as v increases to v 0 . Also it can be seen that lim v(x, t).
If t ≤ T 1 (0+), the mapping v → x v (t) is continuous and strictly increasing, which is zero at v = 0. Therefore lim v(x, t) = 0, and Y + (t) = Y − (t) = 0. In summary, we have
which verifies the Rankine-Hugoniot condition.
For any c strictly between Y − (t) and Y + (t), t > T 1 (0+), we have
and therefore
which verifies the Lax condition.
Remark 4.1. It is easily seen that the entropy solution of (4.1) corresponds to a solution of (ME).
Remark 4.2. By Lemma 3.3, we know that for anyθ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a unique v ′ such that
, which is the mean field equilibrium induced the entropy solution.
N + 1-player game and the selection of Equilibrium
In this section, we consider the N + 1-player game and always assume η = 0. Since the model we are considering is invariant under permutation, it can be easily seen that
and therefore we only need to consider the HJB systems for V N +1 (t, 1, θ):
where the optimal control policy is
As a result of the local Lipschitz continuity of the HJB equation (5.1), the system can be uniquely solved with terminal condition V N +1 (T, 0, θ) = 0, which provides us the unique Nash Equilibrium of the game. Supposing that the representative player is applying the zero control while the other players are taking the optimal policy, then by the definition of Nash Equilibrium we conclude that
Now we prove that if the representative player agrees with the majority, then he will keep his state by taking the zero control.
for any θ ∈ {0, 1 N , . . . , 1} we have
Proof. We only prove the first inequality of (5.2) for even N , and the rest can be proved similarly.
As a result of Y N +1 (t ,   1 2 ) = 0, it is enough for us to show it for θ ≥
According to (5.1), we obtain
By our terminal condition V N +1 (T, 1, θ) = 0, it is easy to see that Y N +1 (T, θ) = W N +1 (T, θ) = 0, and both 
We finish the argument by showing that Y N +1 (t, θ) and W N +1 (t, 1 − θ) are both positive for t ∈ [s, T − ǫ], θ > 
Since V N +1 (t, 1, θ) ≤ T , we get that |Y N +1 (t, θ)| ≤ 2T , |W N +1 (t, θ)| ≤ 2T for any θ ∈ {0, Remark 5.1. Recall that Z(t) is the state of the N + 1 players at time t when agents play the Nash equilibrium given by (HJB). Denote by θ N +1 (t) the fraction of players at state 0, i.e.,
and let U be the solution of (ME) corresponding to the entropy solution of (4.1). According to Proposition 5.1, θ N +1 (t) will always stay on one side of Denote byZ j the i.i.d process in which players choose the optimal controlα(t, i) := (U (t, i, θ(t)) − U (t, 1 − i, θ(t))) + , where U is the corresponding entropy solution of (ME). Also, we can prove the propagation of chaos property by using the technique developed in [5] and [6] .
Conclusion
When η > 1/2, the N-player game converges to the mean field game following the analysis of [1] and [5] . Here we considered the case when η = 0 and showed that the N-player game value functions converge to the entropic mean-field game solution and verified in this case the conjecture of [7] .
When η ∈ (0, 1 2 ), it is always possible for players to jump to the other state. Therefore θ N +1 (t) may not always stay on one side of 1 2 , and when we use Itô's formula to the entropy solution U , there would be extra jump terms. Subsequently our strategy does not work when η ∈ (0, 1/2), and new techniques are needed. We leave this as an open problem. Whenθ = 1/2, it is expected that the N player limit will charge the two solutions we obtain with equal probability (as in [7] ), which is numerically justified by the Figure 3 of [9] . Hence in that case the N -player empirical distribution will not converge to the stable fixed points of the MFG map (in the language of [7] ) unlike what is claimed in the conjecture.
